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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT DESPAIN,

:

Defendant/Appellant,
Appellate Case No. 20060769-CA
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee.

:

Priority No.: 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The factors the State cites to meet its burden to establish probable cause to
arrest Mr. Despain for DUI are insufficient to do so. A detailed examination of
those factors reveals their inadequacy when compared to the requisite elements of
DUI.
The State concedes Appellant's Point II, that the inevitable discovery
doctrine is not applicable in this case to excuse the improper inventory search.
Brief of Appellee at 8, 15. The State, however, then mistakenly argues that the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement is an alternative basis for this
Court to save the ruling of the trial court allowing the seized evidence to be
introduced at a trial.
1

ARGUMENT
I. NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO ARREST
MR. DESPAIN FOR THE OFFENSE OF DUI

The law interpreting probable cause is not, in itself, difficult to understand
or articulate. Appellee mistakenly claims that Appellant misapprehends that law.
Brief of Appellee at 11. In his opening brief Mr. Despain cited several Utah
Supreme Court cases, (Lavton City v. Noon. 736 P.2d 1035,1037 (Utah 1987);
State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986)), and quoted from this Court the
standard employed to analyze and then apply the law of probable cause to the facts
of a given case—the real difficulty with this fourth amendment jurisprudence.
In other words, "we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and
then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to
'probable cause."
However, we do not examine these facts in isolation, but
rather we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether "'a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution [would
believe based upon the] circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit'" the offence for
which he is arrested.
State v.Hechtle. 89 P.3d 185,189 (Utah App. 2004) (citations omitted).
In applying the facts of this case, Mr. Despain presents the articulated
factors focused on and relied on by the deputy to justify the warrantless search. In
his brief he states:
During the course of the hearing, Deputy Spotten testified that his belief
was further supported by his alleged observation that the Defendant's
2

speech was slurred and the opinion of EMT's on the scene that the
Defendant appeared to be acting "paranoid" since the Defendant had
expressed concern about securing his belongings inside his vehicle.
The State argued that Deputy Spotten had probable cause to arrest
the Defendant for Driving Under the Influence of a controlled substance
because witnesses observed the Defendant driving erratically before the
accident and emergency personnel told Deputy Spotten that the Defendant
kept worrying about objects inside his vehicle. These are the only factors
the State presented to establish probable cause to arrest the Defendant for
DUI.
Brief of Appellant at 14. Mr. Despain lists the three separate reasons: the erratic
driving which includes the accident, the EMT's statement that he was acting
paranoid and the deputy's statement that his speech was slurred.
These fourth amendment issues, as often explained by our courts, are "fact
sensitive," and the accurate recitation of those facts are critical for the court's
resolution: State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 15, 103 P.3d 699.
The State, while relying on the same case law definitions of probable cause,
misapplies the facts and overstates the basis of the claim of probable cause. Mr.
Despain and the State have no real factual disagreement other than the State's use
of a few excessive descriptive terms and its duplication of two of the claims. The
dispute, herein, lies with the application of the facts under the totality of the
circumstances rubric, and Mr. Despain's disagreement with the trial court's
conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest him for the crime of DUI. The
requisite task of this Court to re-evaluate and apply the facts to the law is made
easier by comparing the factors and underlying facts with the base elements of the
crime for which Mr. Despain was arrested. DUI has but two elements: (1) actual
3

physical control, and (2) under the influence of either alcohol or drugs (by a
specific amount or measure or to the inability to safely drive the vehicle). Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended).
Analyzing each factor alleged as support for the probable cause to arrest
for the DUI reveals the legally insufficient basis claimed by the State and the trial
court to support this DUI arrest. Moreover, it is appropriate to recall that the
burden is on the State of Utah in a warrantless arrest case such as this and is not
the accused. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992); State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah App. 1990).
Mr. Despain will use the State's proffered five factors, although somewhat
repetitive, for the analysis: The State's factors of [1] erratic driving resulting in
[2] the crash, demonstrate actual physical control but fail to address the other
requisite element. Not every crash on our highways can be attributed to being
under the influence of drugs or alcohol and no presumption exists in the law to
believe such is so. The EMTs statement that Mr. Despain was [3] acting
paranoid about his car, echoed by Officer Mazuran's comment that he seemed
[4] panicked (R. at 36-37), address neither element in any fashion. The final
factor that his [5] speech was slurred fails to establish sufficient indicia of
alcohol or drugs. While this fifth factor might merit some discussion of the
potentiality of being under the influence, ample reasons exist to reject that it
reaches the level of probable cause. Importantly, together the factors fail under
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their totality to meet the standard as well.
More important to the analysis than the single comment about slurred
speech are that other factors are missing and non-existent to establish coindicators of the influence of drugs or alcohol. The officer admitted there was no
odor present (R. 316 at 13,15); neither did he view a balance problem or any
other cues such as red, glossy, droopy or watery eyes, or a flushed face. R. 316 at
15-16, 34. Notably, the EMTs, did not share any such co-indicators or similar
observations with the officer, which they appeared very willing and ready to do
in providing the other unsolicited information and assistance to the deputy. R.
316 at 22.
The deputy actually testified that he had but short dealings with Mr.
Despain. R.316 at 22-23. He testified that he was not a drug recognition expert.
R. at 23. Both considerations balance against any special ability of Deputy
Spotten to discern or interpret a single cue as subjective as that of a person's
speech pattern. He himself testified that the accident was curious and that he
assumed intoxication was the explanation, nothing more than a suspicion or
hunch. R. 316 at 15-16, 25.
Deputy Spotten failed to conduct any field sobriety tests, something the
requisite prudent, reasonable and cautious officer would have done, in spite of his
personal preference or practice to the contrary. R. 316 at 14. Determining
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whether to arrest without supporting that decision with additional objective
indicia that potentially might be available—or not—from the field sobriety tests
is fatal to the State's claim.
Noteworthy, Spotten only offered slurred speech as a factor on re-direct
testimony (R. 316 at 29); he did not list slurred speech as a factor in his initial
testimony, but only after defense counsel quizzed him about any observations or
signals supporting his decision to arrest. He recalled on re-direct only after
being led by the prosecutor and physically shown his report. R. 316 at 29.
Further coloring these observations demonstrating lack of probable cause is
that each of the suggested factors, be they the officer's himself or the EMT's
comment, smack loudly of subjective and conclusory observations. The officer,
after having admitted that he only spent a little time with Mr. Despain, claims the
speech was slurred; but he has no reference of Mr. Despain's speech pattern and
offers no specific stumble over words or phrases. Likewise, the EMT and Officer
Mazuran assign a conclusory characteristic without providing any objective
statements or behaviors to evaluate the conclusion.
In State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this Court in employing
the totality of the circumstances standard to a reasonable articulable suspicion case
discussed the importance of reliance on objective facts rather than subjective
factors. In Trujillo the officer there indicated the young men he stopped were
detained because of "suspicious" behavior and demonstration of "nervousness"
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concluding that given the "lateness of the hour" they were "casing" a business in a
"high crime area." Id. at 89. This Court noted that the officer was unable to
"point to specific objective facts to support his 'hunch.'" Id. at 90. This Court
concluded:
Since Officer Beesley did not articulate reasonable objective facts for
suspecting Trujillo had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal
conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime prevention and
Trujillo's right to personal security and privacy tilts to protect Trujillo from
this unreasonable police interference. Officer Beesley's detention of
Trujillo was unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Inasmuch as we hold the seizure of Trujillo unconstitutional, Officer
Beesley had no right to conduct a pat-down search of Trujillo and,
therefore, the knife should have been suppressed on Trujillo's motion.
Id. Also noteworthy in Trujillo was the Court's reliance on detailed information
that was not present in the officer's statements, to wit: he never articulated what
precisely was suspicious; the officer could not recall the report of any recent
criminal activity in the neighborhood to justify the "high crime area;" and that
there was nothing in the record to indicate it was unusual for people to be walking
along State Street at a late hour. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 945 (Utah App. 1988), the Court
commented on inadequate reliance by law enforcement on conclusory factors:
The officer's mere conclusion regarding defendant's nervousness,
unsupported by relevant objective facts, can have no weight in determining
if he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Our State Supreme Court has opined on this point as well, indicating that for
factors to have weight in supporting a warrantless search they must be objective
factors. State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (officer's determination
7

of probable cause justifying a warrantless vehicle search must be evaluated in light
of his or her experience and training "where there are objective facts to justify the
conclusion").
The factors relied on by the State to support probable cause to arrest in this
case also do not measure up to the fourth amendment intrusion. Review and
recitation to the original reasonable articulable suspicion case of Terry v. Ohio.
392 U.S. 1 (1968), reminds us why the hunch this deputy had here is no different
than the hunch possessed by the officers in Trujillo and Serv above. The United
States Supreme Court stated in Terry:
And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search '"warrant a [person] of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction. And simple "'good faith on the part of the
arresting officer is not enough.'...."
Id. at 21. That hunch was insufficient for reasonable articulable suspicion there
and, a fortiori, Deputy Spotten's hunch and /or suspicion of a DUI is inadequate to
support the higher standard of probable cause in this case.
Accordingly, this Court should find no probable cause existed to arrest Mr.
Despain for the crime of DUI, reverse the trial court and remand for proceedings
consistent with the Sery plea withdrawing that plea and entering a dismissal in the
case.
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II. NEITHER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
NOR THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION JUSTIFY THE SEARCH
OF MR. DESPAIN'S VEHICLE WITHOUT A WARRANT

In Appellee's Brief the State concedes error in the trial court's decision
and ruling finding that the inevitable discovery doctrine justified the warrantless
search of Mr. Despain's automobile. Brief of Appellee at 8,15. The State
concedes the ruling was mistaken and cites appropriate authority relied on by Mr.
Despain in his opening brief. State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 14, 76 P.3d
1159 (requiring prosecution to demonstrate that police would have inevitably
discovered the improperly discovered evidence through other lawful means).
Brief of Appellee at 15.
However, the State then erroneous concludes that the exception known as
the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement provides an independent
basis for this Court to affirm the trial court's erroneous ruling. Numerous reasons
exist why the automobile exception is inapplicable on the facts of this case.
The State correctly indicates that a vehicle need not be mobile to meet this
exception, yet misapprehends the other critical justification for this exception to
the valid warrant requirement. Our Utah Supreme Court has explained the
underpinnings of a valid automobile exception as follows:

Nor was the seizure justified by the "automobile exception" to the
requirement of a warrant. In State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), the
Court stated that this exception applies when
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there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
Id. at 144. quoting Chambers v. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975,
1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). Accord State v. Shields, 503 P.2d 848
(1972). For this exception to apply, the police must have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a
crime and that they may be lost if not immediately seized. Since neither the
driver nor anyone else was around the automobile when the officers
arrived, they had no reason to believe that the contents of the pickup truck
might be lost without an instantaneous search and seizure.
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,411 (Utah 1984).
Our Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Supreme Court
to likewise require this two step analysis:
Moreover, in 1991, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
requirements of probable cause and exigent circumstances as a
precondition to a valid warrantless search of an automobile. Acevedo. 500
U.S. at 569, 111 S.Ct. at 1985-86. Thus, for the roadside search of
Anderson's Cadillac to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, both probable
cause and exigent circumstances must have existed.
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996)(citing California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 569 (1991)). Our Court has recently added:
The danger inherent in traffic stops does not, however, justify the
warrantless search of the interior of a vehicle. Under Utah law, a
warrantless automobile search requires probable cause and exigent
circumstances unless it satisfies traditionally recognized justifications of
protecting the safety of police or the public or preventing the destruction
of evidence. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460,469-70 (Utah 1990); see also
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,412 (Utah 1984); State v. Limb. 581
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).
State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95, f 25, 103 P.3d 699.
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Finally, this Court has also ruled consistently, relying on Christensen and
others:
We thus consider the State's reliance on the "automobile exception9' to the
fourth amendment's search warrant requirement. This exception, first
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132,45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), permits a
warrantless search if the police "have probable cause to believe that the
automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and that
they may be lost if not immediately seized." State v. Christensen, 676
P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 512 n.
6(UtahCt.App.l989).
State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989).
The State contends in its Brief of Appellee that an independent exigency
justified the search of Mr. Despain's car. Brief of Appellee at 18. The State
contends that because the Mr. Despain had called family members to come to the
scene and safeguard his property that an exigency existed to justify a search. Id.
The facts do not support this claim as the deputy, by the State's own admission,
and clearly supported by the record, had obtained the keys to the vehicle from
Mr. Despain and already opened the door and begun the search prior to the
family members'arrival. Brief of Appellee at 21; R. 316 at 39. There in the
transcript the testimony of the assisting officer discloses:
Q. [By Ms. Peters—direct examination]: Okay. And did you assist with the
inventory search at any time?
A. [Officer Mazuran]: I did.
Q. And how did you do that?
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A. I was asked to assist with that. Because there were so many different
things happening, I decided to help.
Q. Okay.
A. And following our standard procedure I began to assist one of the other
deputies with the state tax impound.
Q. Okay. And what is the purpose of the state tax impound? When is a
vehicle searched for that purpose?
A. It is searched prior to the actual impound of the vehicle where it's hooked
up and towed away from the scene. The purpose of that is to do an
inventory of the vehicle and its contents and record them.
Q. So at the time of the search it had been decided that the vehicle was to be
impounded?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And what was the first process of the search of the vehicle?
A. Well, the first process is to search the interior.
Q. And did you do that?
A. I did.
Q. And how did you gain access to the vehicle?
A. Opened the driver's side door.
Q. Okay. And did you observe anything upon opening the driver's side
door?
A. I did. I opened the driver's side door and immediately in the pocket, or I
shouldn't say pocket, but it's kind of the compartment that you find
standard in a lot of passenger vehicles on the lower half of the door, there
was a baggie of marijuana.
Q. Okay. And did you find anything else inside the vehicle?
A. I continued to look in the vehicle. You could smell the odor of marijuana
inside the vehicle. The family members of the defendant had arrived. He
indicated that he wanted the family members to remove an item from the
vehicle. It was very suspicious how it was done.
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Q. Okay. And did you allow the family members to remove the item from
the vehicle?
A. No I did not.
Q. Why is that?
A. Initially, the brother who had come into our crime scene, we had it
blocked off, and he had tried to get into the vehicle and grab this bag.
Q. And did you make contact with him?
A. He was told to stop.
Q. You told him to stop? And then you continued to search the vehicle?
A. I did.
Q. And what did you—Do you recall what you found inside the vehicle?
A. I located a backpack and a box.
Q. Did you gain access to the backpack or the box?
A. I did.
R. 316 at 37-40. The actual testimony from the hearing, as opposed to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law cited by Appellee, clearly demonstrates
that the search had begun before family arrived, that the crime scene was blocked
off, the vehicle was secured and that no exigency existed to independently justify
the search. Under the case law cited above, the two step justification is void at
this point and the search unjustifiable under any grounds including the
automobile exception.
Nonetheless, the State next urges that sufficient probable cause exists to
believe contraband was in the car. Brief of Appellee at 21. Importantly,
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however, as the State lists its basis for the belief it concedes that the suspicions
held by the deputy based on the car accident and the reports from witnesses of the
erratic driving precipitating the accident would not be sufficient to establish
probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of crime.
Brief of Appellee at p. 19. The State continues that adding in slurred speech,
paranoia regarding the locked car and summoning family to remove items "just
before the police began their search" (id. at 21), when added together
demonstrate that Mr. Despain was under a controlled substance and that there
was evidence of that substance inside the vehicle. Id. The State's claim is
incorrect and not factually demonstrated by the record quoted above which
illustrates that the search had begun before the family arrival and therefore that
factor is not permitted to support police behavior after the fact.
What is then left is the erratic driving and crash which the State admits is
not enough for probable cause and then the addition that he was paranoid about
his car and some slurred speech. As noted in argument I, supra, these additional
factors are so subjective in kind to merit little, if any, weight in the analysis to
determine probable cause. A suspicion may be stewing at this point, but no
probable cause exists to justify the police to believe evidence of crime or
contraband is in the vehicle. Inasmuch as no exigency nor any support for
contraband or evidence of crime exists in this scenario, this Court should accept
the concession of the State that the trial court's ruling was in error and determine
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that the automobile exception fails to save the search. The Court should remand
this matter to the trial court with directions to allow withdrawal of the Sery plea,
grant the motion to suppress and order the cased dismissed.

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons this Court should find a lack of
probable cause existed in the case against Mr. Despain to permit his arrest for DUI
or for the search of his vehicle. All evidence acquired because of the unlawful
search should be ordered suppressed and the case remanded to withdraw the Sery
plea and direct the cased to be dismissed.
DATED this £ ? day of June, 2007.

JASON^SCHATZ
Attorney for Appellant
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